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 Trust is a concept that is usually studied in the context of social interactions. At varying 
levels, we trust our families and friends, we trust strangers who share some traits with us and 
even trust institutions like banks with our savings and to handle our personal finances. By 
expansion, political trust, or the public's trust in government as a whole and as individual 
agencies. Trust in government forms a basis for the legitimacy. High levels of political trust 
facilitates the implementation of policies with more willing compliance from the public. This 
is more evident in situations like global and national crises. In such situations of limited 
knowledge and high risks, citizens trust the public authorities to take the right decisions that 
might be, at face value, difficult on the average citizen. 
 This research follows an empirical approach based on data from the fifth wave of the 
Arab Barometer Survey to identify the main determinants of public trust in the government of 
Egypt. After an extensive literature review of the different strands on trust, an ordered logistic 
regression model was developed that accounts for groups of variables including public 
perceptions on government performance, media consumption, views on different topics like 
corruption, democracy and Sharia law and other variables. The study results indicate 
statistically significant positive association between satisfaction with public services, positive 
evaluation of the current economic situation, level of social trust and trust in intentions of 
political leaders and trust in government in general. On the other hand, perceiving democracy 
as a suitable mode of governance for Egypt, perceiving national institutions as corrupt and 
believing in Sharia as the ultimate source of legislation have negative impact on the likelihood 
of trusting the government. Based on these results, several policy recommendations are given 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Nowadays, national governments are operating in a world of megatrends with fast 
paced changes and constantly shifting dynamics. In this living environment, regular disruptions 
to the status quo can either represent excellent opportunities for creating public value (for 
example, technological advancements of artificial intelligence, machine learning tools and 
others) or imminent existential threats to large portions of the population (for example, global 
pandemics, scarce resources, cyber terrorism). Furthermore, the global megatrends are not 
limited to 'new' phenomena or technological breakthroughs. In fact, several international 
organizations, research centers and consultancy firms argue that long-growing trends like 
changing demographic patterns, diffusion of the unipolar world to a multipolar one and the 
increase of individual wealth and power are quickly becoming global megatrends that would 
change how the world works and pose their own new set of challenges for governments (Modly, 
2016; Weller, 2017). 
In such a complex situation, valid information is scarce, and the public lack the 
knowledge and skills needed to make their own decisions. These global drivers greatly impact 
governments leading to a more "volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous operating 
environment" (van der Wal, 2020, p. 10). Another challenge is that ambiguity and lack of 
information can be a source of power conflict among different institutional actors both 
nationally and internationally (Best, 2012). In this case, different agencies interpret the events 
differently thus avoiding blame or claiming authority for their own gain. Such strategy was 
used by several governments during the 2008 financial crisis where authorities kept their press 
releases and public announcements complex and ambiguous on purpose to avoid public blame 
(Johansson & Nord, 2017). 
[6] 
 
This kind of operating environment is no longer a rare occurrence that materializes only 
in natural disasters. As Kuecker (2014) argues, the world will continue facing global crises in 
different areas, to which the global governance system appears to still have no adequate 
response and is persistently resistant to change (Hartley et al., 2019). More importantly, as 
Bughin and Woetzel (2019) argue, there is a widening adaptation gap between countries that 
have recognized the megatrends and are preparing for them and those who are not. 
This operating environment means that public sector organizations need to take the 
initiative to balance the opportunities and threats and help citizens wade through the 
unchartered waters (Suarez & Abdallah, 2019). Despite all odds, policy makers are expected 
to make effective decisions under unavoidable uncertainty (Dessai et al., 2009; Lempert et al., 
2003). The public expects governments to have the answers they do not, and plan for the future 
they cannot foretell. Even with the, traditionally anti-government, Republican US 
administration, Federal government had to interfere significantly to ease the effects of the 
global pandemic (Schlesinger, 2020). Still, as Sargent (2020) reports, opinion polls show a 
majority of Americans believing the Trump administration did not do enough to tackle the 
crisis. Hence, whether through the financial crash (Dobre & Răsăuţeanu, 2016) or the COVID-
19 pandemic (Saez & Zucman, 2020), demand for government action heightens in global crises 
(Janssen & van der Voort, 2020), leading to increasing levels of trust in governments and their 
actions (Siegrist & Zingg, 2014). 
This effect of trust in government decisions is found most commonly when nations face 
external threats such as pandemics (Gilles et al., 2011; Prati et al., 2011; Quinn et al., 2013), 
wars (Mueller, 1970), terrorist attacks (Dinesen & Jæger, 2013; Hetherington & Nelson, 2003) 
and natural disasters (Healy & Malhotra, 2009). During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments 
in developing countries have received a surge in trust with the public seeing them as a defense 
line against a deadly disease (Khemani, 2020). This same understanding applies to 
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organizations and businesses as well, where certain policies can make firms more or less 
skeptic of the government (Cera et al., 2019). 
Though in many cases trust in government is generated naturally, La Porte and Metlaz 
(1996) argue that every act of policy is a potential act of building trustworthiness. As policy 
makers go through their daily business of making difficult choices, including their impact on 
public trust into the discussion can greatly make the same decisions easier and less expensive 
to implement with higher efficiency. Building trust is not an easy task, however, given the self-
sustaining nature of distrust (Kramer, 2017). Nevertheless, trust should not be seen as a 
secondary objective since low trust levels can be a significant impediment to any government 
policy action (Weymouth et al., 2020). Hence, identifying the main determinants of public trust 
in government in each society is of paramount importance to governments. Keeping said 
determinants in mind, policy makers can design their initiatives and programs to prioritize 
trust-building and achieve optimal results. 
On the local level, ten years after the January 25th revolution, Egypt is still setting the 
foundations of the new state and building its democratic institutions. At this stage, the 
democratic capital of the country, its political institutions, electoral process and social and 
economic structural reforms, is what fosters democratic transition (Mitra, 2008). Hence, it is 
important that this national build–up is based on mutual trust between the people and their 
government which, in turn, creates a climate where officials can work effectively and avoid 
stalemate (Hetherington, 1998). Jamil (2019) has shown that in Nepal’s transition from 
monarchy to a republic, improved representation alone was not enough to build trust, but good 
governance and addressing the people’s needs were even more important. 
Walking on Egyptian streets today or scrolling through Egyptian social media feeds, 
one can repeatedly find the discussion revolving, even if at times indirectly, around trust in the 
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government. For almost any piece of political news, Egyptians would question the motives and 
build theories on why the government is following such policy. This happens as society is being 
increasingly divided between diehard government supporters who would agree with any policy 
even if it had direct negative impact on themselves, and permanent skeptics who would directly 
believe in any conspiracy theory that proposes a negative justification for government action 
that can be positive on its face value. 
It follows, therefore, that a study of the determinants of public trust in government in 
the Egyptian context utilizing more recent data is timely. As the Government of Egypt deals 
with multiple national security threats on multiple fronts, including the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the diplomatic crisis with Ethiopia and security situation in Libya, besides its ongoing 
development agenda, it needs now more than ever voluntary public compliance with difficult 
decisions and policies, which can only be a result of trust. This much needed political trust 
makes good governance possible, in the same time, the right amount of mistrust supports good 
governance by driving accountability (Devine et al., 2020). 
The objective of this study is to empirically identify the main determinants of public 
trust in government and assess the relative impact of each determinant with a focus on Egypt 
post-2013. This objective is articulated in the research question: "What are the main 
determinants of public trust in the government of Egypt post-2013?" This question is answered 
through a set of empirical hypothesis introduced in the conceptual framework. 
Beyond this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature on trust covering 
different aspects of the topic from psychological, sociological and political perspectives. 
Moreover, a review of similar case studies in different countries is provided with a focus on 
studies following an empirical approach. Chapter 3 provides a conceptual framework for this 
research and introduces its empirical hypotheses. Chapter 4 discusses the dataset used, 
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methodology followed and the formulation of the econometric model. The results of the 
methodology described are reported in Chapter 5 with a discussion of the main findings and 
insights obtained. Finally several policy recommendation are offered to government officials 
that would help them design policies to rebuild the trust of the Egyptian people in their 
government and the study is summarized in Chapter 6 with the main conclusions highlighted 


















Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Understanding trust 
 There is a proliferation of research on trust. Scholars from different fields have 
addressed the topic from different perspectives. A major debate between sociologists and 
psychologists considers the nature of trust as rational versus relational, or a combination of 
both (Dunn, 1988; Lewis & Weigert, 1985). In the individualistic rational view, trust is formed 
as every individual calculates the probability of obtaining favorable outcome. Thus, in an 
ambiguous situation, trust depends on the perceived cost and benefit analysis built on the 
behavior of others (Deutsch, 1962). Promoters of rationality thus argue that trust is only 
relevant when it has an impact on decisions we make and a higher level of trust would lead to 
a higher likelihood of cooperation (Ermisch et al., 2009; Gambetta, 1988). This understanding 
is mostly adopted in the business transactions world where dependence on calculative trust was 
found to have positive influence on suppliers’ performance (Axelrod, 1984; Poppo et al., 2016; 
Williamson, 1996). 
 On the other hand, advocates of relational trust argue that what rational trust theorists 
are discussing is actually calculativeness rather than trust (Williamson, 1993). While trust 
certainly has a rational element, the non – rational elements cannot be explained by rationalist 
theories (Nooteboom, 2002) and that research ignoring the leap of faith concept misses out an 
essential component of trust (Möllering, 2005). In this understanding, trust combines weak 
knowledge with some mysterious, unaccountable faith in the subject. Hence, an actor who 
thinks trust to be desirable, but not rationally justifiable may still decide to trust (Hardin, 1993) 
with the hope of building up a rational explanation (Luhmann, 1979). This comes in agreement 
with Rousseau et al. (1998) who differentiated between trust, being about values and intentions, 
and confidence, that considers competencies and abilities. Hence, trust is expected to dominate 
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when morality – related issues are at stake (De Bruin & van Lange, 2000; Earle & Siegrist, 
2006). 
Looking further into relational trust, some scholars argue that since it is based on the 
belief in the goodness of others, relational trust is learned in a very young age (Cooley, 1956; 
Erikson, 1950; Giddens, 1991; Parsons, 1991; Uslaner, 2002). Furthermore, it is not subject to 
change on the short and medium terms (Mishler & Rose, 2001) except through hard experience 
and trauma (Allport, 1961; Glanville & Paxton, 2007; Rosenberg, 1956). Some scholars have 
even gone further and found evidence that the individual’s tendency to trust is actually part of 
their genetics (Mondak et al., 2017; Sturgis et al., 2010), a view that is highly contested by 
observations from history where trust in post-war Germany saw sharp changes that contradict 
with the aforementioned genetically-generated trust thesis (Newton et al., 2018). 
 Based on the two understandings of the nature of trust discussed above, several models 
have been developed to explain how trust is formed. As mentioned earlier, most scholars agree 
that risk and uncertainty are prerequisites for trust formation (Cheshire, 2011), and that trust 
includes a willingness to become vulnerable to the object of trust (Levi & Stoker, 2000; 
Sztompka, 1999). Zucker (1977) proposed a three-mode trust production model that starts with 
process-based trust which is generated through past or expected experiences either first hand 
or by reputation. The second mode is characteristic-based trust that is generated through social 
similarities between actors and the third mode is institutional-based trust that is derived from 
formal social structures. 
 Another model for trust formation is derived from the rules, roles and routines of the 
society. Lane (1997) argues that systems of rules that govern interactions among society 
members enable meaningful interactions between them and thus form the basis of trust. 
Furthermore, the expectation of the technical capacities of the society’s role performers 
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represents a key element of trust (Barber, 1983) allowing trust to develop in standardized roles 
rather than individuals (Meyerson et al., 1996). Finally, Feldman and Pentland (2003) describe 
the trust in the routines of our daily lives, which necessarily also includes the trust in the rules 
and role performers of the society. This understanding acknowledges that trust can develop 
over time where Lewicki and Bunker (1996) provide a three-stage model for this development. 
Trust, they propose, starts based on calculative reasoning in a phase they termed ‘calculus-
based trust’, next ‘knowledge-based trust is formed that where predictability of others increases 
and trust is based on expected actions. Finally, humans develop ‘identification-based trust’ 
where the understanding and appreciations of the others’ intentions and motives forms the basis 
of trust. 
2.2 Social and political trust 
 Another important strand in the trust literature is the differentiation between social and 
political trust. Building on Coleman's (1988) concept of social capital, multiple scholars have 
studied social trust as the glue that joins society together and facilitates its smooth operation 
(Newton et al., 2018) and as a key component of the human capital, which is in Fukuyama's 
(1995) view, more important than physical capital. In fact, several scholars maintain the view 
that social capital and social trust are the same (Arrow, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2000; Putnam, 
2000; Wilson, 1997), or at least, have a mutually reinforcing effect on one another (Brehm & 
Rahn, 1997). Another understanding, however, argues that social capital needs cultivation and 
requires a prerequisite level of social trust to stabilize social relationships (Hearn, 1997; Lewis 
& Weigert, 1985; Misztal, 1996). 
At any case, there is also a debate in the literature on the generation of social trust. One 
argument is that trust is built bottom-up and stems from personal optimism (Uslaner, 2002) 
starting at the family and generalizing to strangers (Job, 2005). Hence, small, homogenous 
[13] 
 
communities tend to have higher levels of social trust (Newton et al., 2018). This would 
practically mean that social trust, generating from culture, is a precondition for civic 
engagement among society members (Stolle, 2001). The counter argument held by Putnam et 
al. (1994) considers social trust a product of civic engagement and people’s engagement in 
their community, where interactions among different people in diverse groups allows people 
to trust one another. A view opposed by Newton (1997) since time spend interacting with 
groups is too little to develop trust. Lamsal (2001) also refers to trust by recommendation where 
we can trust unknown others based on the trust that our connections have in them. This kind of 
trust gets weaker as the chain of trust lengthens. 
As for political trust, Job (2005, p. 2) defines it as the “attitudes people have towards 
the future actions of government, government organizations and the people who administer 
them”. This understanding promotes a view that trust is an active attitude rather than a passive 
state (Möllering, 2005), especially in cases of distrust that Hosking (2019) argue to be much 
more conscious than trust. It is important to make the distinction between political trust in 
neutral and impartial government institutions (Manning & Wetzel, 2010; Zmerli & Newton, 
2017) and in political agents (Rothstein & Stolle, 2008). Van Deth (2000) further adds an 
independent element of trust in international organizations and Worthington (2001) adds an 
element for the political community represented by professional politicians and political 
parties, where Dunn (1988) even differentiates between trust in the intentions of the politicians 
and their professional capacities. In a simpler distinction, Keele (2005) divides political 
systems into the ‘regime’, or the institutional structure of government, and ‘authorities’ of the 
elected leaders of government. He further adds that while distrust in authorities can be resolved 
through electing new ones, distrust in the regime is more critical and may threaten the 
continuing of government, and challenge regime legitimacy (Miller, 1974; Miller et al., 1979; 
Miller & Listhaug, 1990). 
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Moving to the relationship between social and political trust, while a group of scholars 
maintain that there is no relationship between the two (Newton, 1999; Putnam, 2000), Blind 
(2006) provides an overview of the linkage between the two in an interactional relationship 
where social capital facilitates collective and collaborative action needed in politics (Arrow, 
1974), and a trusted government further promotes social trust (Fukuyama, 1995; Levi, 1997). 
Other scholars also argue for a one way relationship, where social trust generalizes to form 
political trust (Job, 2005) but which can only be applicable to well-established democracies 
(Jamil & Baniamin, 2020). In other studies, it was found that good governance increases social 
trust regardless of the society’s original level of trust (Newton et al., 2000; Pharr et al., 2000; 
van der Meer, 2003). Still, since most research on the topic is based on cross – sectional data, 
it is statistically difficult to prove a causal relationship (Siegrist & Zingg, 2014) although a 
correlation is repeatedly found in most recent research based on updated surveys (Newton et 
al., 2018; Spierings, 2017). 
An important concept in political trust is trust in institutions. The literature includes a 
debate on whether or not systems and institutions can be trusted and treated the same way as 
individual trust. Seligman (2000) argues that when we trust systems, we are actually trusting 
the roles and expected routines rather than the institution itself. Moreover, institutions represent 
a basis of trust between different actors since shared expectations allow trust to arise 
(Möllering, 2005), thus, by reinforcing institutions, the radius of trust in the society widens 
(Fukuyama, 2002). 
On the other hand, other scholars argue institutions can also be objects of trust, not just 
sources (Sydow, 1998; Sztompka, 1999). According to Giddens (1990), trust in institutions 
happens through ‘access points’ where the public deal with representatives of the institution. 
Hence, trust in institutions is based mainly on the visible performance rather the internal 
workings of the organization. This trust builds up through continual positive experiences and 
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can grow further since it is considered impersonal (Luhmann, 1979). In this sense, trust in 
different institutions is built on different criteria originating from the nature of said institution, 
a view that is empirically negated by Camões and Mendes (2019) who found that citizens see 
no differences between institutions when building their trust decisions. Furthermore, 
institutional trust is built on the assumption that others also share the assumptions on the system 
(Luhmann, 1988) and as such, these institutions can only be effective if they are trusted (Child 
& Möllering, 2003). A different approach to explaining institutional trust is offered by Jamil 
and Askvik (2013) where citizens trust the institutions because they believe in the normative 
idea upon which it is built. 
2.3 Trust in government 
Moving to trust in governments, Dunn (1988) explains how citizens are indifferent 
about how their government is formed as long as they trust its effectiveness. However, while 
government institutions are still being established, trust is more difficult to achieve. According 
to Levi (2019), a trustworthy government is one that keeps its promises, delivers public goods 
and services effectively, engages in fair decision making and can be held accountable for its 
mistakes. While more discussion on the determinants of trust in government will be presented 
later in this text, it is worth noting that such elements of a trustworthy government make it 
impossible for international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations to substitute the role 
of national governments in the eyes of their citizens (Blair et al., 2017), though working with 
them can be a source of legitimacy and trust (Khemani, 2020). 
But how is trust in government formed? Van de Walle and Bouckaert (2003) proposed 
multiple models explaining this process. In the ‘micro performance theory model’, trust in 
every government institution is separate, and the question becomes about the perception of that 
individual institution as part of the government. Similarly, in the ‘dominant impact model’, 
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individual agencies have their own trust levels, however, certain agencies have larger impact 
on the overall trust in government. This relative dominance of agencies can change over time 
depending on the changing roles of different agencies. Alternatively, the ‘reversed causality 
model’ offers an opposing understanding where the positive attitude towards the government 
in general can lead to a positive evaluation of specific agencies, or vice versa in case of distrust. 
This is important because if a culture of distrust becomes the social norm, government efforts 
in communicating with the public will not necessarily lead to an objective society. Hence, as 
Levi and Stoker (2000) argue, a government may achieve all the attributes of trustworthiness, 
but still not gain the citizens’ trust since they lack the sufficient knowledge to believe that 
government will act in their interest. This, however, does not necessarily link to economic 
status, where field work by Ali and Hossain (2006) shows that even the poor of Bangladesh 
had elaborate understanding of how the government works, and are actually more trusting of 
the government than educated experts, a paradox explained by Jamil and Askvik (2013) by the 
acceptance and respect to power normalized in large power – distance societies. 
A distinction is also made in the literature between new and old, well – established 
democracies in terms of trust in government. Listhaug and Jakobsen (2018) discuss how trust 
and support to government is weaker in new democracies since the people have a shorter 
experience with democracy, have exceedingly high expectations of the political institutions, 
and the institutions themselves are still weak. Hence, it follows that trust in older democracies 
is stronger, even it falls at certain times, since the government has a reserve of trust that citizens 
can use in times of crises (Thomassen & van der Kolk, 2009). A relevant argument is that 
citizens who vote for the winning party or candidate tend to trust the government more later on 
(Anderson et al., 2005). In new democracies, however, Esaiasson (2011) argues both winners 
and losers retain their trust levels as elections stimulate the democratic attitudes among the 
population. Still, even in a well – established democracy like the US, data has repeatedly shown 
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that the acute polarization between political parties leads to a decline in political trust 
(Hetherington, 2005; Hetherington & Rudolph, 2015; Uslaner, 2015). 
2.4 The value of trust in government 
 But why should governments care about citizens’ social and political trust? While some 
scholars argue that declining trust is of limited political consequence (Citrin, 1974; Citrin & 
Green, 1986; Lipset & Schneider, 1983), a growing body of literature highlights trust as a 
cornerstone of legitimacy of the government (Levi, 2019; Suchman, 1995; Yousaf et al., 2016), 
and its personnel (Jamil, 2019). It is also considered by many as an indicator of good 
governance in general (Blind, 2006; Bouckaert et al., 2005; Jamil & Askvik, 2013; Kim, 2005; 
Mishler & Rose, 2002; van de Walle & Bouckaert, 2003). Moreover, Uslaner (2018) notes the 
positive outcomes on the political life including increased voter turnover, willingness to pay 
tax and greater sense of wellbeing among the population. In general, high levels of trust in 
government makes it easier to govern, increases citizen willingness to comply and even makes 
it easier for public agencies to recruit and retain top talent (Hetherington, 1998; Hvidman, 
2019; Levi, 2019; Siegrist & Zingg, 2014; Taylor et al., 2009). But this leeway to govern is not 
without its limits. As Manning and Wetzel (2010) show, higher trust improved governments’ 
capacity in Latin America, but not as much in the more developed OECD countries where the 
return on investment in trust is much lower, highlighting the need for a public balance between 
trust and skepticism. 
Looking into more specific areas of public policy, research supports the importance of 
public trust in government in times of crises for an effective government response. Esaiasson 
et al. (2020) suggest the importance of monitoring citizen trust and actively seeking to build it 
during difficult times. As Hetherington (1998) have shown, people interpret government 
actions in crises differently based on the levels of political trust they have before the crisis. 
[18] 
 
Generally, research in different areas has shown that society ties tighten, and trust increase 
when nations face external threats including wars (Greenaway & Cruwys, 2019), natural 
disasters (Toya & Skidmore, 2014) and others. This peaking trust, however, is found to decline 
back to normal levels over time as the crisis passes (Gilles et al., 2011; Quinn et al., 2013). 
Having mentioned the peaking trust phenomenon in times of crises, it is important to 
discuss the ‘rally round the flag’ effect that offers some explanation to this. The term, 
introduced by Mueller (1970), originally corresponded to the short – lived spikes in approval 
ratings of US presidents immediately following high profile foreign policy events, especially 
wars (Brody, 1991; Jordan & Page, 1992; Lian & Oneal, 1993; Mueller, 1970, 1973; Oneal et 
al., 1996; Parker, 1995). This effect was later extended by several scholars to include terrorist 
attacks (Dinesen & Jæger, 2013; Perrin & Smolek, 2009; Wollebæk et al., 2012) and other 
external threats. More recently, empirical studies have indicated the same effect taking place 
during the ongoing COVID-19 crisis in Denmark (Baekgaard et al., 2020; Schraff, 2020) and 
several other European countries (Bol et al., 2020). This is especially surprising because 
opposed to wars and terrorist attacks, the pandemic does not offer a specific visible enemy to 
the public, in fact, the damage to the economy resulting from government – imposed lockdown 
measures is more clearly visible (Baekgaard et al., 2020). At any case, the argument has its 
opponents. Baum (2002) argues that the boost in trust is only a result of decreasing criticism in 
the media and from political parties to the actions of the incumbent during crises. Moreover, it 
was empirically found that rally effects are mainly driven by people who already supported the 
leadership (Edwards & Swenson, 1997; Perrin & Smolek, 2009). 
In the context of pandemics, studies of recent outbreaks of Ebola, H1N1, H1N5 and 
others showed that trust plays a key factor in public compliance with government measures 
(Blair et al., 2017; Condon & Sinha, 2009; Liao et al., 2010; Podlesek et al., 2011; Prati et al., 
2011) even when the public satisfaction with government’s performance is limited (Siegrist & 
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Zingg, 2014). This is especially important because in such situations, governmental measures 
like lockdowns and recommendations of personal hygiene are largely voluntary and depend on 
individual compliance (Han et al., Forthcoming; Sibley et al., 2020). Moreover, beyond the 
peak of pandemics, the longitudinal study by Gilles et al. (2011) suggests that public trust in 
medical organizations was a significant predictor for acceptance of vaccines. Additionally, 
Sibley et al. (2020) suggest that this increased levels of trust will sustain post the lockdown 
measures and lead to higher satisfaction with government performance. 
Another aspect of increasing concern to governments is their eroding influence over 
information due to the diffusions of the internet and the viral spread of disinformation online 
that can have damaging impacts on ground (Im et al., 2014). The literature on the topic of 
misinformation, or ‘fake news’ as publically known, is diverse and no single direction of 
causality is agreed on. Spread of fake news is seen in the literature as both caused by growing 
distrust in political institutions and mainstream media, and a cause of it. Fake news as a 
determinant of distrust will be discussed later on in this text, however, it is important to note 
that the consumption of fake news does have an impact on people’s decisions and actions, 
including voting patterns (Guess et al., 2020; Weeks & Garrett, 2014). This consumption is 
repeatedly found to be a result of distrust towards mainstream media, prompting a migration 
towards alternative sources which represent an ideal breeding ground for misinformation 
(Zimmermann & Kohring, 2020). The same work also empirically found that the less one trusts 
news and politicians, the more one believes in online misinformation. This is because 
distrusters seek to adopt new forms of viewing the world (Lewandowsky et al., 2017) offered 
by online disinformation. 
A significant volume of literature also discusses the positive correlation between trust 
and economic growth (Beugelsdijk et al., 2004; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000; Zak 
& Knack, 2001). Scholars cite a wide array of theoretical explanations for this based on both 
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social and political trust. In terms of social trust, empirical (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Porta et 
al., 1996) and experimental (Ahmed & Salas, 2008) show interpersonal trust promotes 
cooperation and volunteerism, especially in large organizations, thus facilitating faster growth. 
As for political trust, Fukuyama (1995) argues that trust is an effective mean to lower 
the cost of any social, economic or political relationship, hence making it easier for 
governments to implement their policies. In this understanding, “trusted government 
institutions can extend the benefits of social cooperation to a growing range of collective 
problems that would be too costly to resolve without trust” (Scholz & Lubell, 1998, p. 399). 
Hence, the higher trust in government levels are, the more the citizens comply with the law 
(Marien & Hooghe, 2011) and the less there is a need for expensive monitoring and punishment 
mechanisms (Coleman, 1990; Levi, 1988; Ostrom, 1990). In addition, trust was found to force 
political leaders to be more accountable (Knack, 2002), thus lowering perceptions of corruption 
that undermine institutional effectiveness (Miller & Listhaug, 1990) and promote the seeking 
of individualistic solutions by citizens (Della Porta & Vannucci, 1999). From a practical 
perspective, Exadaktylos and Zahariadis (2014) concluded that low levels of political trust 
decreased the Greek government’s administrative capacity to implement the austerity measures 
post the 2008 financial crisis, and Lundin (2007) showed that trust is important even between 
government agencies as a prerequisite for successful cooperation in policy implementation. 
Trust is also important to support efforts to adopt e-government systems and increase 
their adoption by the population (Jameel et al., 2019; Kalu, 2006; Redburn & Buss, 2004). The 
experience of most developed countries with the adoption of e-government services was not 
easy. During the early stages of implementation, adoption will face resistance as citizens are 
not familiar with the risks (Lallmahomed et al., 2017). This is critical because the success of 
any government digitization effort depends on citizens’ willingness to adopt the service 
(Shareef et al., 2011) based on their perception of its usefulness, which trust was found to be a 
[21] 
 
significant determinant of (Abu-Shanab, 2017; Carter & Bélanger, 2005; Horst et al., 2007). 
Beyond adoption, empirical work by Welch et al. (2005) that individuals who trust the 
government more are more likely to be satisfied with the e – government services provided. 
But trust in this regard is not just about trust in the political leaders. Since the perceived risks 
in online transactions are higher including concerns about privacy of personal data (Asiimwe 
& Lim, 2010; George, 2002), scholars have noted the need for trust in both the integrity of the 
service providers themselves, and the technical capacity of the systems and infrastructure for e 
– government to work (Abu-Shanab, 2014; Evangelidis et al., 2002). 
2.5 Determinants of trust in government 
 Building on the significant value of public trust in their governments, Scholars have 
done significant work to find what the determinants of trust in government are. These vary 
greatly across cultures and countries (Sulemana & Issifu, 2015), still, it is widely accepted that 
trust is difficult to establish, but easy to destroy (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2001; Slovic, 1993), 
and governments face difficulty in understanding how to build it (Fukuyama, 1995). Still, it is 
argued that it is possible to create policies that create trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Sztompka, 
1999). Moreover, as shown by Frye and Borisova (2019), even short term political events do 
have an impact on citizens' trust. In a report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Suarez and Abdallah 
(2019) suggest making more data available publicly and seeking feedback from all stakeholders 
as simple ways to enable public trust. This transparency matters because it helps citizens form 
their perceptions (Alessandro et al., 2019). Walle and Bouckaert (2003) discuss different 
theories of how trust is different among different agencies of government. Moreover, Blind 
(2006) discusses the linkage between social trust, i.e. interpersonal trust among society 
members, and political trust in public institutions.  
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 One of the most cited policies as builders of trust are state welfare policies. The core 
argument is that according to Putnam (2000), trust is based on the “background of shared social 
networks and expectations of reciprocity”. Hence, by contributing to this building this 
background, welfare states contribute to trust (Larsen, 2013; Newton, 2001; Rothstein & Stolle, 
2008; Uslaner, 2002, 2008). The literature on the topic argues for a two – way relationship 
between welfare policies and trust levels, especially social trust. A group of scholars argue that 
historical levels of trust explain the establishment of current welfare states in Scandinavia 
(Bergh & Bjørnskov, 2011), their support (Daniele & Geys, 2015) and persistence (Jensen & 
Svendsen, 2011). Kumlin et al. (2018) explain this by arguing that trust facilitates cooperative 
outcomes and protects against free riders of the society. On the other hand, welfare systems are 
found to build the trust levels in society, more specifically in the case of universal welfare 
policies that Larsen (2007) found to correlate with higher levels of social trust, while selective 
policies either erode it, or limits it to certain groups of the ‘trustworthy’ (Kumlin et al., 2018). 
This is also supported by the results of Anderson and Singer (2008) who found that higher 
inequality relates to lower levels of political and social trust, which is not necessarily related 
to the individual’s level of income (Krieckhaus et al., 2014; Kumlin, 2011). 
 On the opposing side, several scholars argue against depending on welfare policies to 
support political trust. While welfare measures helped ease the effects of the Arab oil embargo 
in 1973 and maintained political trust levels in the West (Kornberg & Clarke, 1992), major 
economic crises usually lead to harsh austerity measures and welfare cuts (Starke et al., 2013). 
Experience from Portugal (de Sousa et al., 2014) and Greece (Ellinas & Lamprianou, 2014) 
post the 2008 global financial crisis show political trust levels dramatically dropping after 
austerity measures. Hence, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) and Uslaner (2011) describe the 
inequality trap where growing levels of inequality and corruption make it impossible for 
governments to apply welfare policies leading to reducing trust. Additionally, from a different 
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perspective, liberal economists argue that state welfare taking over private sector functions 
eventually lead to a decay in trust in the private sector that can later develop to the government 
(Fukuyama, 2001; Stadelmann-Steffen, 2011). 
 Another determinant widely cited in the literature is the increasing exposure to 
disinformation or fake news. The impact of news reporting in general, whether on traditional 
media outlets or online, is thoroughly researched. According to Pharr et al. (2000), citizens’ 
evaluation of government performance are subjective and depend on their access to 
information. Hence, media exposure has been found to be correlated with increase in civic 
engagement, political interest and trust in government (J. M. Avery, 2009; Norris, 2000, 2011; 
Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010). This is not only limited to mainstream media (Ceron & Memoli, 
2016), but is also extended to online media usage that was found to advance political 
knowledge and support for democratic values (Ceron, 2015; Nisbet et al., 2012; Stoycheff & 
Nisbet, 2014; Valenzuela et al., 2009). 
But the impact of media is not always positive. Negative and biased reporting of news 
has been found to reduce political trust and increase cynicism (Bowler & Karp, 2004; 
Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006; Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Trust in mainstream media is rapidly 
declining, especially during crises and scandals (Newman et al., 2018), which is pushing 
readers towards alternative sources that may contain disinformation (Zimmermann & Kohring, 
2020). Ognyanova et al. (2020) found that while, exposure to fake news is related to distrust in 
mainstream media, it does not necessarily lead to political distrust as it highly correlates with 
the original political orientations of the reader, making context important to judge the impact 
of fake news. 
Based on the noted relationship between political and social trust, a group of scholars 
argued for building trust in government through fostering interpersonal trust within the society. 
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This can happen through encouraging volunteerism within the community (Tocqueville, 2000). 
To explain this, Putnam (2000) argues that volunteering in diverse groups brings people from 
different backgrounds together who would otherwise distrust each other. Hence, this effect 
increases with more prolonged volunteering experiences (Newton, 2001). Empirically, studies 
have shown that students’ participation in extracurricular activities is associated with them 
being more politically aware and engaged later on in their adult life, an important sign of trust 
in the political process (Damico et al., 1998; Homana, 2018). 
The empirical study of determinants of trust, both social and political, is an established 
field with significant volume of published work from different regions and addressing different 
perspectives (Zhao & Hu, 2017). While these determinants vary greatly across countries and 
cultures (Sulemana & Issifu, 2015), and empirical studies from different countries give 
different and sometimes contradicting results (Tomankova, 2019), a review of different case 
studies is useful in identifying key themes and spotting possible similarities with previous 
literature. 
Starting with demographic and socioeconomic factors, while some scholars argue that 
their effect on trust is weak or non – existent (Li, 2004; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Shi, 2001), 
most empirical work does find them to be major determinants (Christensen & Laegreid, 2005; 
Maxwell, 2010; Wenzel, 2006; Wong et al., 2009) with Sulemana and Issifu (2015) concluding 
that the women of Ghana are less trusting of the public institutions than men, and multiple 
scholars obtaining results indicating that being young, obtaining higher education and more 
income all lead to decreased levels of trust (Darwish, 2020; Nasr & Hilal, 2007; Zhao & Hu, 
2017). Issues of macroeconomic performance of the government are also found to be 
significant determinants of trust in different contexts (Addai & Pokimica, 2012; Spiteri & 
Briguglio, 2018). During the austerity measures and bail out plans throughout Europe post the 
2008 financial crisis, Drakos et al. (2019) found that levels of trust dropped significantly, but 
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even more so for EU institutions rather than national governments. It is thus not surprising that 
we are witnessing today a rise in right wing populist politicians in several European countries. 
Moving to issues of governance, literature seems to agree that satisfaction with public 
services and performance of government agencies significantly improves trust in government 
(Bovens & Wille, 2008; Campbell, 2003; Chanley et al., 2000; Christensen & Laegreid, 2005; 
Citrin & Green, 1986; Espinal et al., 2006; Jameel et al., 2019; Lawrence, 1997; Mishler & 
Rose, 2001; Nye, 1997; Rockers et al., 2012; Salim et al., 2017; Thomas, 1998; Wong et al., 
2009). Other elements of good governance are also found to be significant determinants 
including satisfaction with democracy (Ariely, 2013; Christensen & Laegreid, 2005; Grönlund 
& Setälä, 2007; Hood, 1991; Piotrowski & Van Ryzin, 2007; Spiteri & Briguglio, 2018; 
Sulemana & Issifu, 2015; Wong et al., 2009), and elements of decentralization as fiscal 
decentralization (Kim et al., 2020). It is thus no surprise that the OECD (2017) considers the 
focus on good governance issues as key to combat distrust. At any case, perceptions of good 
governance are subjective. Government officials and employees of the public sector for 
example are found to have more positive perceptions of quality of governance and more trust 
in government (Han et al., 2019). Moreover, Jamil and Baniamin (2020) argue that the culture 
of obedience and reliance on authority, coined authoritarian culture orientation by Ma and 
Yang (2014), can lead to high trust levels in government despite its poor policy performance. 
This phenomenon, labelled false trust by Norris et al. (2019), appeared repeatedly in low and 
middle income countries where trust is surprisingly high (Askvik et al., 2011; Jamil & Askvik, 
2013; Shi, 2001; Wang, 2005). 
In the MENA region, although the shared language and culture of Arab countries allows 
perceptions of threat to travel across borders (Spierings, 2017), different countries react 
differently to threats based on the base levels of trust present in the society prior to the crisis 
(Manning & Wetzel, 2010). Moreover, Fukuyama (2002) argues that the ethnic and sectarian 
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tensions and conflicts in the region undermine the effectiveness of social capital altogether. In 
any case, available studies on public trust in governments of the region are limited, and mostly 
based on data from during and immediately after the Arab Spring era when factors of 
interpersonal trust (Spierings, 2019) and perceptions of corruption (Gasser, 2018) where 
predominant over socioeconomic factors. 
A key theme found in the results of different empirical studies from the region highlight 
sharp political divisions (Alijla, 2019) and ethnic and religious tensions (Addai et al., 2013; 
Salloukh et al., 2015) as having significant negative impact on generalized trust levels in the 
respective societies. It is thus not surprising that Alijla (2016) found the perception of equity 
and fairness of public institutions in Lebanon, a highly politicized society with very exclusive 
trust circles (Maktabi, 1999), to be a key determinant of trust in those institutions. Moreover, 
with limited prospects of democracy in the region, even after the Arab Spring, citizens are more 
interested in the quality of public services and effectiveness of public institutions as 
determinants of their trust in them (Alijla, 2019; Darwish, 2020; Kong, 2014). 
From this literature review, it can be seen that there is a gap in research addressing the 
determinants of trust in government in the context of Egypt, more specifically, post-2013. 
Additionally, since there is only very limited work on political trust in Arab and Islamic 
countries, the impact of Arab and Islamic culture and religious teachings and media atmosphere 
is understudied. This research attempts to fill this gap through the main research question 
"What are the main determinants of public trust in government in Egypt post-2013?" and a set 






Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
The model specification, the selection of relevant explanatory variables to include in 
the regression from the wide set of measured variables available in the dataset is a key step that 
must be based on theoretical understanding to support certain hypotheses. For the dependent 
variable, the survey asked respondents to report their trust in government at four levels: no 
trust, little trust, some trust, and great trust. These four levels are coded into the variable 
Government Trust as a categorical variable with values 1 to 4 referring to the increasing levels 
of trust in government. 
As for explanatory variables, Nye (1997) identified economic, socio-cultural and 
political factors as the main determinants of trust in government. Christensen and Laegreid 
(2003) also add demographic factors to the list of determinants. Those include gender, 
education level, income and urban or rural living. In Egypt, females are generally considered 
by the current government as a main supporting base. This has been seen time and again in 
their exceptionally high participation rates in elections and other forms of informal political 
support. Moreover, women in Egypt are now witnessing record representation both in the 
executive and the legislative which is happening only as a direct result of quota systems put in 
place by the government rather than popular trust in female leadership. Hence, the first 
hypothesis expects a higher likelihood of trusting the government among women as compared 
to men.  
H1: Females are more likely to trust the government in Egypt 
For political factors, 10-level scale variables for the individual's satisfaction with 
government performance and their view of democracy as suitable for Egypt are reported. 
Following the literature, it is expected that having higher levels of satisfaction with the 
performance of the government in Egypt will be more likely to trust the government. 
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H2: Respondents who are more satisfied with government performance are more 
likely to trust the government in Egypt 
Moreover, with the economic performance being a significant indicator for the overall 
government performance, evaluation of current economic situation is included as a separate 
variable that captures the views of respondents who might be less interested in politics. It is 
expected that those who have positive views on the current status of the economy will be more 
likely to trust the government. 
H2*: Respondents who have positive views on the current economic situation are more 
likely to trust the government in Egypt 
As for views on democracy, as a country with new and still unstable democratic 
procedures, a large percentage of Egyptians do not believe that democracy is a suitable system 
for the country. With the current government performing poorly on several international 
democracy rankings and good governance indices, it is expected that those who believe that 
democracy is suitable for Egypt will be less likely to trust the current government.  
H3: Respondents who perceive democracy as a suitable mode of governance in Egypt 
are less likely to trust the government in Egypt 
Media consumption was also accounted for whether traditional media or social media 
measured by the number of hours of consumption of TV and social media. With the country's 
mainstream media being largely controlled by the government and rated by international 
institutions as highly censored, it is expected that those who watch longer hours of TV will be 
impacted by the directed message and be more likely to trust the government in Egypt. 
H4: Watching more TV increases the likelihood of trusting the government in Egypt 
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On the other hand, social media is a freer platform for expressing opinions that can be 
opposing of government policies. In this sense, social media transcends being a platform for 
expression of opinions, but in fact it was the main organizing tool for the 2011 revolution and 
is even used today by opposition figures and Muslim Brotherhood figures in exile to 
communicate their message to the local audience. Hence, respondents who report using social 
media for longer hours are more likely to be exposed to political opposition messages and 
therefore less likely to trust the government. 
H5: Spending more time on social media decreases the likelihood of trusting the 
government in Egypt 
Following the literature discussed in chapter (2), interpersonal trust is included in the 
model as an indicator of social capital level. Members of society with higher levels of social 
capital are expected to be more trusting in general, and thus more likely to trust the government. 
H6: Higher levels of social trust increase the likelihood of trusting the government in 
Egypt 
Some variables were also added that are relevant to the Egyptian context, including the 
perception of corruption at the national level, trust in the intentions of politicians and the 
perception on Sharia law versus the will of the people as a source of legislation being an 
indicator of the belief in political Islam. For Sharia, since hardcore believers in Sharia as a 
source of legislation are typically supporters of political Islam groups, they are less likely to 
trust the current government that oppresses them and considers them a threat to national 
security. 
H7: Those who believe that Sharia law should be the only or main source of 




H8: Those who perceive the national institutions as corrupt are less likely to trust the 
government in Egypt 
H9: Those who believe that political leaders are concerned with the needs of ordinary 



















Chapter 4: Methodology 
This chapter provides an overview of the approach used to answer the research 
questions. This begins with a description of the dataset used and its source. Additionally, the 
rationale behind the selection of variables to be included in the regression model as both 
dependent and explanatory variables is explained along with a layout of the preliminary 
statistical analysis steps done to ensure data validity. Finally, the regression model formulation 
is discussed with pointing out the advantage of the selected model over other possible 
approaches. 
4.1 Data 
This study attempts to empirically identify the key determinants of public trust in 
Government in Egypt. The data set used was the Arab Barometer Survey1 in its fifth wave 
published in 2018. The survey was conducted by a non-partisan research network to provide 
insights on social, political and economic attitudes of ordinary citizens of the Arab world. The 
fifth wave data used in this research includes responses from a representative sample of the 
Egyptian population whose answers were collected in October and November 2018 and 
discussed a wide array of topics including socioeconomic, demographic and governance issues. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Before proceeding to describe the model specification, descriptive statistics were run 
on all the used variables to better understand the data set. This includes computing the mean 
and standard deviation for each variable in the model. This gives important information on the 
frequency of distribution of data to ensure it being representative (Altman & Bland, 1996). 
Moreover, a correlation matrix is compiled, which is important as an input for other scholars 
                                                          
1 Available for download at https://www.arabbarometer.org/survey-data/data-downloads/ 
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wishing to reproduce or check the results (Zientek & Thompson, 2009). Finally, Cronbach's 
alpha coefficient is calculated for the list of variables. The alpha coefficient is an indicator of 
internal consistency reliability of the data, or in other words, the percentage of variance in the 
scores resulting from reliable variance rather than random error (Cronbach, 1951).  
Table (1) reports the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the regression 
model. This includes the number of observations, mean, standard deviation and minimum and 
maximum values for each variable. 
Table (1): Descriptive statistics 
Variable 
Name 




Level of trust in 
government 
1 (no trust) to 4 
(great trust) 
2331 2.947 0.9392 
Male Gender of respondent 0 (female), 
1(male) 
2331 0.5 0.5 
Government 
Performance 




dissatisfied) to 10 
(completely 
satisfied) 
2331 4.849 2.838 
Suitability Of 
Democracy 
Belief that democracy is 
suitable for Egypt 
0 (unsuitable) to 
10 (suitable) 
2331 5.743 2.464 
TV hours Number of hours spent 
watching TV on a typical 
day 
1 (0 hours) to 5 
(10+ hours) 





Number of hours spent 
using social media on a 
typical day 
1 (0 hours) to 5 
(10+ hours) 
2331 1.92 0.951 
Sharia Views on sharia versus will 
of people as a source of 
legislation 
1 (legislations 
should be entirely 
based on the will 
of the people) to 5 
(legislations 
should be entirely 
based on Sharia) 
2006 3.565 1.179 
Economy 
Evaluation 
Evaluation of the current 
state of the economy 
1 (very bad) to 4 
(very good) 
2222 2.479 0.806 
Leaders 
Intentions 
Trust that political leaders 
are concerned with the 
needs of ordinary citizens 
1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree) 
2231 2.395 0.858 
National 
Corruption 
Perception that national 
institutions are corrupt 
1 (strongly 
disagree) to 4 
(strongly agree) 
2245 3.146 0.807 
Social Trust Belief that other can 
generally be trusted 
0 (cannot be 
trusted), 1 (can be 
trusted) 
2331 0.359 0.479 
Results rounded to three decimal points 
Several conclusions could be drawn from this table. For the dependent variable 
governmentTrust, the results show that more than 72% of respondents have some degree of 
trust in government. For the categorical variables, the value of mean was around double the 
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value of standard deviation, an indicator of typical frequency distribution (Altman & Bland, 
1996). 
Moving to pair wise correlations, Table (2) reports the correlations matrix with the ones 
statistically significant at the 95% interval denoted with an asterisk. The table also reports the 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient which is calculated at 0.5448, meeting the threshold usually 
accepted in social sciences (Mohamad et al., 2015). 
Table (2): Correlations matrix and Cronbach's alpha ceofficient 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Government Trust 1.0000       
Male -0.0454* 1.0000      
Government 
Performance 
0.4589* -0.0290 1.0000     
Suitability Of 
Democracy 
-0.2821* 0.0473* 0.0812* 1.0000    
TV hours 0.1087* -0.3072* 0.1550* -0.1252* 1.0000   
Social Media 
Hours 
-0.0816* 0.1755* -0.0542* 0.0942* -0.1890* 1.0000  
Sharia -0.1094* -0.0907* -0.0162 0.0663* 0.0789* -0.1974* 1.0000 
Economy 
Evaluation 
0.5296* 0.0198 0.5335* -0.2144* 0.1019* -0.0305 -0.0384 
Leaders Intentions 0.4374* -0.0025 0.4721* -0.0885* 0.0784* -0.1463*  0.0233 
National 
Corruption 
-0.3077* 0.0652* -0.5160* -0.0175  -0.1165* 0.2042* -0.0580* 
Social Trust 1 
0.2138* 
0.0271 0.2765* 0.0718* 0.0552* -0.034 -0.0505* 
 





1.0000       
Leaders Intentions 0.4452* 1.0000      
National 
Corruption 
-0.3727* -0.4086* 1.0000     
Social Trust 0.1305* 0.1552* -0.1090* 1.0000    
Scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha):      0.5448 
* is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval 
It can be seen that all statistically significant pair wise correlations are weak to moderate (below 
+/- 0.5) which indicates the limited impact of interactions between the variables. They are 
hence ignored in the regression model discussed next. 
4.3 Regression model 
Since the dependent variable in this case (citizen trust in government) was coded as a 
categorical value variable taking only the values of 0 (no trust), 1 (little trust), 2 (some trust) 
or 4 (great trust), the researcher was interested in the probability of occurrence of each level of 
the dependent variable given the set of explanatory variables as shown in equation (1). Thus, a 
linear regression model is not useful. The main limitation with a linear model would be the 
generation of fitted probabilities that are smaller than zero or larger than one (Wooldridge, 
2013). 
 (1) 
To account for the ordered nature of the dependent variable, an ordered logit model 
(Menard, 2001) is developed with the general form in equation (2). The model reports the odds 
ratios of the different levels of the dependent variable (trust in government) to occur, i.e. 






Where beta coefficients representing the log odds (logit) can be used to compute either the 
probability or odds ratios. But the restricted proportional odds model assumes that for all 
variables, the relationship between each pair of outcome groups is the same (Williams, 2006), 
which in this case would mean that the odds of moving from no trust in government to little 
trust in government is the same as the odds of moving from some trust in government to great 
trust in government. The generalized ordered logit model (Williams, 2016) overcomes this 
assumption that is often violated by automatically testing for variables that fit the assumption 
and apply the restriction on them.  
 After performing the regression, diagnostic tests are run to ensure the validity of the 
model. STATA software automatically reports the log likelihood Chi-square value of the model 
that refers to whether the model as a whole is statistically significant. Additionally, the 
McFadden's pseudo R-squared (McFadden, 1973) is also reported that captures the proportion 
of change in terms of likelihood. For each individual variable, the Wald's statistic is reported 










Chapter 5: Results and Discussion 
 After applying the approach described in Chapter (3), the obtained results are reported 
in this chapter for the regression model itself and its diagnostic tests. The second part of the 
chapter includes an analytical discussion of the results to obtain the main insights useful to both 
academic and policymakers. 
5.1 Regression model 
 Running the logistic regression model as specified in the methodology section, the 
results obtained are reported in Table (3). For easier interpretation, the results are reported in 
the marginal effects form for the Government Trust level 4 (great trust). In other words, the 
change in probability that the respondent will have great trust in the government with a unit 
increase in the variable holding other variables constant at means. 
Table (3): Logistic regression results 
For Government Trust = 4 (great trust) 
Variable Marginal Effect Standard Error 
Government Performance 0.0190615*** 0.00541 
Suitability Of Democracy -0.0286188*** 0.00491 
TV hours -0.0099413 0.01272 
Social Media Hours 0.002891 0.01055 
sharia -0.0377732*** 0.00832 
male 0.0099511 0.02288 
Economy Evaluation 0.1314413*** 0.01801 
Social Trust 0.0770128*** 0.02088 
Leaders Intentions 0.0674027*** 0.01506 
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National Corruption -0.03042** 0.01406 
Number of observations 1835 
LR chi2(51) 1104.01 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.2358 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The interpretation of the individual variables' marginal effects and their theoretical 
meanings would be reported in the discussion section below. However, it is important to 
discuss the results of the various diagnostics run on the model to confirm its validity and 
reliability for interpretation. It can be seen that the model as a whole is statistically significant 
at the 99% confidence interval (p<0.01). Moreover, Mcfaden's pseudo R-squared is high, for 
the purposes of a logistic regression model, at 0.24 which represents a good fit of the model 
(McFadden, 1979). 
5.2 Discussion 
 This section provides a discussion of the results obtained from the regression model 
reported above with a focus on the statistically significant variables at the 90%, 95% or 99% 
confidence intervals. 
5.2.1 Evaluation of current government's performance 
 As described above, the variable Government Performance measures the respondents' 
evaluation of the current government's performance. In the regression model, the results 
reported show that increasing the satisfaction with current government performance by one 
level increases the probability of having great trust in the government by 1.9% with statistical 
significance at the 99% confidence interval. Looking at the different levels of satisfaction, it 
can be seen that at all levels of satisfaction with government performance, a respondent is more 
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likely to have great trust in the government. However, this increase on the odds is not uniform 
across all levels. Figure (1) shows a distribution of probabilities of Government Trust level 4 
at different levels of Government Performance holding all other variables constant at their 
means.  
 
Figure (1): Distribution of predicted probabilities of Government Trust level 4  at different levels of Government 
Performance holding other variables constant at means (author generated) 
Graphically, the curve has a sharp rise when evaluation of government performance is 
at levels 1 and 2, and then again at level 10, with a plateau at all the levels in between, which 
contain most of the respondents. This can be explained by the fact that answers are self-reported 
and prone to subjectivity. Respondents who report even minimal satisfaction with the 
government's performance, for example at level 1, are 43% more likely to have great trust in 
the government than those who are completely dissatisfied. This does not change much till the 
other extreme where respondents who are completely satisfied with the government's 
performance are more than 8 times more likely to have great trust in the government than those 
who are completely dissatisfied. Similar results have also been obtained in the literature where 
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very high and very low levels of satisfaction with government performance result in sharp 
changes in levels of trust (Wang, 2016). 
5.2.2 Evaluation of the suitability of democracy for Egypt 
Moving the variable Suitability Of Democracy, it captures the respondents' opinions on 
democracy and their belief that it is suitable for Egypt. Increasing the perception of democracy 
as suitable for Egypt by one level reduces the probability of having great trust in the 
government by 2.9%. As shown graphically in figure (2), predicted probabilities of having 
great trust in government increase initially with increase of perceptions of suitability of 
democracy for Egypt but then decrease again as that perception increases further giving rise to 
the overall negative effect described above. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of predicted probabilities of having great trust in Government at different levels of Suitability Of 
Democracy holding other variables constant at means (author generated) 
One possible explanation for this trend is that respondents who perceive democracy as 
suitable for Egypt are more likely to view Egypt as currently less democratic, and hence, trust 
the current government less. However, as shown graphically in figure (3) that represents the 
cross tabulation of the perceptions of suitability of democracy with the perceptions of the extent 
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of democracy in Egypt, respondents who report higher levels of perceiving democracy as 
suitable for Egypt also report perceiving Egypt as highly democratic. At any case, this 
correlation was rather weak at only 0.0663 and statistically insignificant warranting further 
investigation into the issue. 
 
Figure (3): Perceptions of suitability of democracy versus the perceptions of the extent of democracy in Egypt (author 
generated) 
5.2.3 Number of hours spent watching TV and using social media on a typical 
day 
 Looking at the impact of media consumption on trust in government, both traditional 
media (TV) and social media are found to have no statistically significant impact on trust in 
government in Egypt. This result can contradict with the traditional wisdom in the literature on 
media consumption. With Egyptian TV mostly owned controlled by the state (Allam, n.d.), it 
would be expected that Egyptians would not trust their TV outlets (Kalogeropoulos et al., 
2019). Moreover, they would be more selective with their consumption avoiding sources they 
distrust (Tsfati, 2010). In fact, this would have been intensified after two revolutions (2011 and 




 Still, TV is the most trusted medium in Egypt (Allam, n.d.), and despite it being largely 
censored, results of the regression model show that it negatively impacts trust in government. 
This can be explained through a deeper look into the data. While the variable TV hours 
measures the consumption of TV, it does not specify the genre or media material consumed. In 
fact, survey data from Dennis et al. (2017) show that comedy is the most popular TV genre in 
Egypt. Additionally, the pairwise correlations between TV consumption, perception of the 
complexity of politics and interest in politics reported in Table (4) show a statistically 
significant positive correlation between perceiving politics as complicated and the 
consumption of TV, and a statistically significant negative correlation between interest in 
politics and consumption of TV. These two correlations, while not causal, suggest that those 
who watch longer hours of TV are in fact not watching political news and thus their distrust in 
government is largely coming from the interaction with other variables. Further research into 
the TV consumption patterns in Egypt is needed to shed more light on this relationship. 
Table (4): Pair wise correlations between TV hours, polComp and polInterest 
 




    






Politics Interesting -0.2322* -0.3396 1 




5.2.4 Views on Sharia law 
 As Islam's religious law, Sharia in its classical form not only regulates the individual's 
relationship with the God, but also with the society and the state (El Shamsy & Coulson, 2020). 
Despite the existence of a wide range of political Islam groups that vary greatly in terms of 
their fundamentalism and approaches, they all agree on their promotion of Sharia as the only 
viable form of law that should supersede other laws (Roy, 2017). With the ousting of the 
Islamist Muslim Brotherhood from government in 2013 and then labelling them a terrorist 
organization effectively banning them, Egypt has witnessed a hard crackdown on political 
Islam groups, especially the more extremist ones. It is thus expected that supporters of and 
sympathizers with political Islam, who consider Sharia as the ultimate source of legislation, 
would feel detached from the post-2013 Egypt and distrust the current government. 
 Empirically, regression results conform to the theoretical understanding above. With 
statistical significance at the 99% confidence interval, increasing the level of belief that Sharia 
should be a source of legislation decreases the probability of having great trust in the 
government by 3.7% holding other variables constant. Looking with more detail, figure (4) 
shows those who believe that legislation should be mostly or entirely based on Sharia rather 
are 33% and 45% respectively less likely to have great trust in the government than those who 
believe legislation should be entirely based on the will of the people. 
 In this context, it is important to differentiate between followers of political Islam as an 
ideology, and extremists who follow illegal paths to enforce their ideas. As shown by Masoud 
et al. (2016), Egyptians, and Arabs in general, are likely to be more convinced with religion-
based political arguments, even if they are not direct followers of any political Islamic group. 




Figure (4): Distribution of the probabity of having great trust in the government at different levels of believing in Sharia as a 
source of legistlation (author generated) 
5.2.5 Gender 
 Addressing the demographic factor of gender, the model found no statistically 
significant impact of gender on government trust. 
5.2.6 Evaluation of the current state of the economy 
 Much like the variable Government Performance, Economy Evaluation reflects the 
relationship between the livelihood of the people and their trust in government. While the 
correlation between perceptions of the current state of the economy and the individual's actual 
income is weak, it is in fact found to be a statistically significant determinant of trust in 
government. A one level increase in the positive view of the economy increases the probability 
of having great trust in the government by over 13%. This further reinforces the argument that 
trust in government is largely based on the perceptions of its performance in different areas 
rather than the actual results achieved by the government and the tangible quality of its services. 
Figure (5) shows that the probability of having great trust in the government increases 




Figure (5): Distribution of the probabity of having great trust in the government at different levels of evaluation of the 
current state of the economy (author generated) 
5.2.7 Social trust 
In agreement with the literature on interpersonal trust and social capital, the regression 
results show a positive impact of trusting others in general and trusting the government. With 
statistical significance at the 99% confidence interval, those who believe that others can 
generally be trusted are 7.7% more likely to have great trust in the government. 
5.2.8 Trust in political leaders 
Egypt has a long history of bureaucracy and institutionalized government, levels of trust 
in which have varied over time. As shown by Becker et al. (2011) history of trust, or distrust, 
in bureaucratic agencies continues to impact trust in newer agencies, even years after their 
dissolution. But Egyptians appear to personalize the government. The variable Leaders 
Intentions that captures the respondents' perceptions on the intentions of political leaders is 
found to be a statistically significant determinant of trust in government, with a unit increase 
in the belief that political leaders are concerned with the needs of ordinary citizens increasing 
the probability of having great trust in the government by 6.7%. Figure (6) shows the 
distribution of the probability of having great trust in the government at different levels of 
belief in the intentions of political leaders. It can be seen graphically that those who strongly 
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agree that political leaders are concerned with the needs of ordinary citizens are around twice 
as likely to have great trust in the government as those who disagree.  
This result means that to some degree, Egyptians perceive the government institutions 
and government officials indistinctively which contradicts a group of scholars (Dalton, 2004; 
Klingemann, 1999). On the other hand, this view follows McGraw and Dolan (2007) and 
Wendt (1999; 2004) who argue that our views about states are often linked to our views about 
their leaders, a concept reinforced intentionally by many political leaders to boost their 
popularity. In this sense, the average citizen's understanding of politics is not very different 
from that of children who equate the government with the President (Easton & Dennis, 1969; 
Hess & Torney, 1967). 
 
Figure (6): Distribution of the probabity of having great trust in the government at different levels of belief in the good 
intentions of political leaders (author generated) 
5.2.9 Perception of the corruption of national agencies 
With Egypt historically having high levels of corruption of government officials on 
both the petty and grand levels, it is no surprise that perceptions of corruption of national 
agencies are found to have significant impact on government trust, albeit only at the 95% 
confidence interval. Increasing the perception that national agencies are corrupt by one level 
decreases the likelihood of having great trust in the government by 3%. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 The objective of this study was to empirically identify the main determinants of public 
trust in the government of Egypt after both the 2011 and 2013 revolutions using a recent dataset 
published in 2018. This was done through a set of empirical hypothesis covering a range of 
explanatory variables. In this chapter, the research done is summarized along with its main 
conclusions and policy implications. 
6.1 Research summary 
First, an extensive literature review that covered the different definitions and 
conceptualizations of social and political trust, the value and practical impact of trust in 
government and a review of different studies attempting to find determinants of trust. Next, a 
generalized ordered logistic regression model has been developed accounting for several 
categories of explanatory variables to find their impact on the independent variable, trust in 
government. The regressions model estimated the change in probability of having great trust 
in the government with the change in the independent variables. 
 Results of the regression model show results that are mostly in line with the literature. 
Addressing the hypotheses (H1), (H4) and (H5), no statistically significant relationship was 
found by the model. Hence, the null hypotheses could not be rejected and the gender, 
consumption of traditional media and social media in fact have no impact on the trust in 
government in Egypt. 
As for (H2), the public perceptions of the performance of government are found to be 
significant determinants of trust in government. This positive relationship agrees with scholars 
who argue for a rational-based trust formulation model where we create our trust judgements 
based on an assessment of the benefits we receive. A similar relationship was also found with 
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perception of current economic situation of the country. Therefore, the hypotheses (H2) and 
(H2*) could be accepted. 
For the perception that democracy is suitable for Egypt, (H3) could be accepted where 
regression results show that increasing the level of perceiving democracy as suitable for Egypt 
actually decreases the likelihood of trusting the government. The same also applies for (H6), 
(H8) and (H9) regarding social trust and perceptions of national corruption and trust in political 
leaders respectively. 
Relating to (H7), after a brief experience with political Islam, Egyptians were largely 
divided along the line of supporting or opposing this form of politics, usually represented by 
their goal of universally applying the Islamic Sharia law. Survey data still show that over 50% 
of respondents agree that legislation should be entirely or mostly based on Sharia, with over 
27% believing that the will of the people has no place. Regression results show that those are 
far less likely to trust the current government than those who do not share the same view on 
Sharia law. 
6.2 Policy implications 
Drawing on the empirical findings of this research, and on previous literature, this 
section provides several recommendations of action for policy makers that would build public 
trust in governments. The recommendations are divided into subsections based on different 
themes addressed by the proposed policy. 
6.2.1 Government performance as a game of perceptions 
 With varying levels of success, improving public services offered is the ultimate goal 
of any legitimate government. But this research's empirical findings show the value of citizens' 
perceptions of government performance and quality of services, rather than the actual results, 
as a significant determinant of trust. This is why the process of policy making and 
[49] 
 
communication of actions and their results is of great importance to building trust in the said 
policy, and by generalization, the whole government. For example, implementing sound 
economic policies without taking into account the social inequalities and marginalized groups 
in society will lead to only short-lived trust after which citizens will demand further political 
and social reforms (Blind, 2010). 
 To accommodate this, Weymouth et al. (2020) argue for changing the form of public 
participation in governance to a partnership. They argue that limiting the design of policies to 
bureaucrats influenced by lobbyists and influence groups leaves some main public concerns 
unattended to. In addition, the public can think of the government, even if democratically 
elected, as imposing policies on them leading to some form of resistance to change (Rozema 
et al., 2012). Some critical factors of public partnerships in policy design include making 
collective judgements on the priorities of specific local communities (Rittel & Webber, 1973), 
integrating input from sources beyond just experts and technocrats (Turnpenny et al., 2009) 
and communicating policies to the public through performance targets that directly relate to 
citizens' concerns and creates mechanisms of accountability and monitoring (Boswell, 2018). 
 But accounting for public perceptions while designing policies should not translate to 
censoring the media or imposing specific messages. As shown in the discussion section, 
Egyptians are less interested in news media and the highly censored message available on 
Egyptian TV does not achieve its desired goal. Cheema (2010) argues for a transparent 
government with open access to information as a tool to build public trust. This kind of direct 
communication with the public can remedy low trust and align public perceptions of 
government agencies with their actual performance (Canel & Sanders, 2013; Lee, 1999, 2001, 
2008, 2011; Lee et al., 2012). Moreover, government communication employing familiar and 
well-designed symbolic elements, including logos and public figure endorsements, evokes 
positive associations and improves public trust (Alon-Barkat & Gilad, 2017; Karens et al., 
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2016; Susila et al., 2020; Teodoro & An, 2018) and distracts viewers from logically 
unpersuasive arguments (Alon-Barkat, 2020). 
6.2.2 Strengthening the foundations of democracy 
 Though the regression results show a negative relationship between perceiving 
democracy as suitable for Egypt and trusting the government, the literature almost unanimously 
agrees that the proper democratic process and legitimacy and political trust are interlinked and 
support each other (Blind, 2010). In the context of crises, this is especially important since 
authoritarian regimes might abuse the surge of trust vested in governments and gain more 
control (Khemani, 2020). Cheema (2010) argues that improved parliamentary procedures and 
oversight not only leads to a more controlled executive, but also increases the interface of 
elected representatives with their constituencies, thus improving trust. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between democracy and political trust is not linear (Arpino & Obydenkova, 2020). 
Data from the EU shows that trust levels in government agencies of non-democratic states can 
be as high as that in the most democratic states (van der Meer, 2017). 
In Egypt, data from the Arab Barometer Survey show that levels of trust in parliament 
are quite low and the majority of people are not interested in politics and find it too complicated, 
which in turn, reduces participation. Literature shows that, in a young democracy, repeated 
experiences with the ballot box gradually increases political knowledge and raise interest in the 
process (Smith, 2002). This happens through the repeated and direct interaction with elected 
representatives in town hall meetings and community focus groups where citizens get to voice 
their opinions and form their perceptions of the process first hand (Carman, 2010). This 
positive impact on trust is even more apparent when voters achieve their intended goals while 
perceiving the process as fair (Christensen, 2019). 
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Another channel of strengthening the new democracy is through education. In new 
democracies, levels of political education and awareness are rather low (Morduchowicz et al., 
1996) making even the younger voters engage in affectionate intelligence making judgements 
based on trust (Susila et al., 2020). Moreover, political trust is a concept that is developed at a 
relatively young age (Claes et al., 2012). Feddes et al. (2019) studied that effects of teaching 
democratic values at schools in the Netherlands and improving children's knowledge about the 
political process and found that it had significantly positive impacts on their trust in the 
government. Moreover, Claes and Hooghe (2017) performed a longitudinal study on the 
education of political sciences and civics in Belgium and found that classroom instruction, an 
open class climate and being a member of school boards and student activities increases levels 
of political trust of the students. This agrees with Fridkin et al. (2006) who found an association 
between democratic practices in class and political trust. 
6.2.3 Healing the wounds of society 
Although the Egyptian people are fairly homogenous in terms of demographics with 
very limited variations in ethnicities, religions and cultural heritages, the ousting of Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) from rule in 2013 instantly alienated a portion of society that either were 
direct members of the brotherhood, or were ideological supporters and empathizers. Herstad 
(2017) describes how the brotherhood took a political blow in almost all Middle Eastern Arab 
states around the same time, leading to the radicalization of some of its elements (Hamid et al., 
2017). Beyond the MB, several other political Islam groups operate in Egypt with varying 
levels acceptance to the democratic process and degrees at which they want to give the state 
purely religious functions (Ranko & Nedza, 2016). Interestingly enough, Gorman (2018) found 
that even self-identifying secularists may have negative views of Islamists, but still express 
support for some Islamist ideological positions. As reported in table (3), the dataset used in this 
research shows that 45% of respondents still believe in Sharia as the ultimate form of law. 
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So how does the policy maker reconcile with such a huge portion of the Egyptian 
people? Thus far, the Egyptian government has been keen on portraying an image of 
moderation that is mainly directed at building rapport with Egypt's religious minorities and 
Western political leaders where the President and other prominent figures regularly attend 
Christian masses and even sponsored the renovation of Egypt's Jewish cultural sites (Farahat, 
2019). As for the Muslim majority, the government has thus far focused its efforts on 
combating religious extremism and Jihadist thought. From the beginning, the political 
leadership called on Al-Azhar scholars to review their curricula and reform religious discourse 
(Mneimneh, 2015), a call to which Al-Azhar responded by several initiatives including mobile 
anti-radicalization units that communicate directly with the public on coffee shops and other 
gathering areas, albeit with limited impact (El-Gawhary, 2018). 
Nevertheless, the regularly public disagreements between Al-Azhar's Grand Imam Al-
Tayeb and public figures aligned with the government speak to a chasm widening between the 
two sides. Al-Tayeb is regularly seen to be suspicious of the government-sponsored 'religious 
discourse reform' as an attempt to take control of the constitutionally-independent institution 
(Wafy, 2020). Policy makers must note that damaging the credibility of Al-Azhar as an 
institutions of moderation could end up creating more breeding ground for extremist thought. 
Hence, the Egyptian government should embrace the independency of religious thought as its 
own form of freedom of thought and expression. Rather than imposing reforms on religious 
institutions facing internal resistance, the government would be better off sponsoring cross-
cultural dialogue that embraces the acceptance of others. As Berger (2019) shows, support for 
Sharia is not necessarily problematic if paired with the understanding that Sharia is man's own 
interpretation of religion rather than a fixed set of laws. This conforms with the concept of 
post-Islamism, a cultural reform of political Islam that allows it to maintain its core Islamic 
ideals while moving beyond the concept of an Islamic state (Mahdavi, 2020). 
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6.2.4 Strengthening national institutions 
The general public, especially in transition democracies, tend to attribute personality 
traits to behavioral patterns of different institutions (Shepard, 1935). The empirical results of 
this research supports this concept. Egyptians are found to link their trust in the political leader 
with their trust in the government as a whole. Thus, government should make it a priority to 
strengthen, empower and trust the public institutions and bureaucrats (Khemani, 2020). This 
devolution of power can only happen through effective decentralization that allows for direct 
engagement of the lower level government officials (Cheema, 2010). Moreover, reinforcing 
the independency of other branches of the state, including the judiciary, through respecting the 
rule of law can significantly add to trust levels in said branches, and by generalization, the 
government (Blind, 2010). This conforms with Devine et al. (2020) who argue that trust 
judgements can spillover, for example from one politician or institution to the others. 
6.3 Research limitations and recommendations for future work 
Despite the value added by this research to fill an important gap of knowledge, there 
still are several limitation to this work. First, the data used was all self-reported with all the 
subjectivity expected from that mode of reporting. Conclusions are to be taken with the 
understanding that they are based on perceived evaluations rather than objective ones. 
Secondly, dependence on survey data alone limits the scope of results. Complementing the 
study with qualitative in-depth interviews would add to the value of results, however, it was 
not possible due to time constraints of this work. 
Another set of limitation arise from model specification errors. Statistical studies of 
social topics cannot be ideal by nature (Avery, 2005). This study is no exception. One of those 
statistical errors is endogeneity, an error where the values of one independent variable depends 
on the values of other independent variables. Since social topics almost always have complex 
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two-way relationships, it is difficult to avoid this type of error. For instance, this study treats 
both education level and income as two separate explanatory variables for trust in government. 
However, in reality, and as shown by numerous studies, income level is itself dependent on 
education level. Another type of errors is multicollinearity which refers to high correlations 
among predictors. Statistical literature, however, argues that multicollinearity can be safely 
ignored in the case of dummy or categorical variables (Allison, 2012) which is the case in this 
study. 
This study calls for several future projects to complement our understanding of trust in 
government in Egypt's context. Studies on the Egyptians' understanding of democracy and their 
views on it are necessary to explain why their evaluations of the current government's 
democracy level and their views on the democracy's suitability for the country do not match. 
Moreover, further studies on media consumption patterns in Egypt and the differentiation 
between traditional media and social media platforms are needed to understand their impacts 
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